Level 55
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Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

Consciousness and Personal Identity

The puzzles of subjective experience and personal continuity that remain among philosophy of mind's hardest problems: what consciousness is, why it exists at all, and what makes a person at one time the same person at another.

60-Second Review

Express review

A condensed, point-by-point summary of the module, for reviewing right before a test or exam.

  1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Chalmers distinguishes the easy problems of cognition from the hard problem of subjective experience.
  2. Qualia and the Knowledge Argument: Mary's Room. Jackson's Mary learns something new upon seeing red, challenging physicalism about qualia.
  3. Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?". Nagel argues bat echolocation shows subjective experience resists objective, third-person description.
  4. Locke on Memory and Personal Identity over Time. Locke grounds personal identity in continuity of consciousness and memory, not soul or body.
  5. Parfit on Personal Identity and What Matters. Parfit argues identity itself is not what matters; psychological continuity and connectedness are.
  6. The Psychological Continuity Theory versus the Bundle Theory. Hume's bundle of perceptions contrasts with psychological continuity theories of the self.
  7. Teletransportation, Fission, and Identity Puzzles. Teletransportation and brain fission test whether survival can outrun strict numerical identity.
  8. Personal Identity and the Ethics of Future Selves. Weak psychological continuity with future selves reshapes prudence, ethics, and policy debates.

This module continues after "Philosophy of Mind and the Mind-Body Problem" in the syllabus. If you haven't reviewed it yet, it may help set the context.

Key points

Visual module map

1The Hard Problem of Consciousness
2Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"
3Parfit on Personal Identity and What Matters
4The Psychological Continuity Theory versus the Bundle Theory
5Personal Identity and the Ethics of Future Selves

Alternative visual view: a simplified sequence of some of the module's key points, in their order within the syllabus.

Your module mastery

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Final test

You need to review all key points to unlock the final test.

Optional mini-games

Extra practice, with no penalty, to reinforce the module's content.

Review Flashcards

Review each key point with cards that flip to reveal the summary.

Memory

Match each concept with its definition in as few attempts as possible.

Time Attack

Answer true or false statements before time runs out.

Chronological Order

Put the module's key points back in their original order.

Further reading

Bibliography and cited sources used to create this module.

  • Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.
  • Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
  • Locke, J. (1689/1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (P.H. Nidditch, Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Hume, D. (1739–40/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature (D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.