Metaethics: Realism, Relativism, and Expressivism

A condensed, point-by-point summary of the module, for reviewing right before a test or exam.

1. Moral Realism and the Existence of Objective Moral Facts. Moral realism holds that objective, mind-independent moral facts exist and make moral judgments true or false.
2. G.E. Moore's Open Question Argument and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Moore's Open Question Argument holds that "good" cannot be defined by any natural property without begging the question.
3. Error Theory: Mackie's Argument from Queerness. Mackie's error theory says moral claims are meaningful but all false, since no objective values exist.
4. Emotivism and Ayer's Non-Cognitivism. Ayer's emotivism holds moral statements merely express feelings of approval or disapproval, with no truth-value.
5. Hare's Prescriptivism and Universalizability. Hare's prescriptivism treats moral judgments as universalizable prescriptions, not descriptions of fact.
6. Moral Relativism: Cultural and Metaethical Variants. Moral relativism holds moral truth is relative to a culture, framework, or individual, not universal.
7. Contemporary Expressivism: Blackburn's Quasi-Realism. Blackburn's quasi-realism earns realist-sounding moral talk from an expressivist, projectivist foundation.
8. Moral Realism Revived: Cornell Realism and Naturalist Ethics. Cornell realism naturalizes goodness as a complex property, escaping Moore's and Mackie's objections.